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Abstract: As the sociology of scientific knowledge has revealed, research fields may frequently maintain oilegitimize hypotheses independently or in the absence of experimental data o, oih". empirical evidenceconstituting conclusive scientific pr.oof in accordance with declared rnethodological standar:ds. This essayaims to show certain of the mechanisms and social factors that allow scientific discourse to t'unction asa self-referential system, i'e., in all autonomous manner in regards to the borcler conditions of empirical
experience, as described bY W. Quine. I particularly concentiate here on how the organization of scien-tific work in selected disciplines .utt t"r.,lt in the local findings of individual laboratories being quickly
transformed into unrevisable facts (black boxes). The phenom*enon of the self-reference of scientific dis-
course is well illustrated by the case of the debate on the cause of AIDS. This discourse was so configuredthat by referring to one another and Lry theoretical imputation researchers .uur.a tn" hypothesis on the
causai relation between HIV and AIDS to begin to baaccepted as an indisputable fact, even though thecorroborating evidence had not appeared in the rneantime.
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Introduction
It is traditionally considered that objective reality-understood as something ex-
ternal and independent of the research process-plays a part in closing scientiflc
controversies and shaping our knowledge. Many contempor4ry.-r.urch trends in the
sociology of scientific knowledge (SSK) and in science and technology studies (STS),
however, display the limitations or inadequacy of such an episternological approach.
They suggest that scientiflc knowledge is charact erized by "limited ernpirical sensi-
tivity." Often science turns out to be cognitively closed to the "external,, world. In
this context the category of autopoiesis can be recalled [see Luhrnann lgg0, L995;
see also Maturana, Yarela 1980]. Flere, I understand, autopoiesls as the self-refer-
ence and self-legitimizatiott of discourses, i.e., the point of reference for knowiedge
generated by the social system is not the "external" world, but the cognitive system
itself-to a large degree it is able to legitimize knowledge independently of what
could be described as empirical input. Metaphorically speaking, social systems are
"encysted" in such a manner that the cognitive process takes place in a sort of co-
coon, which acts as "protection" against the influences of the environrnent. These
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intiuences clo not reveai themselves diiectly, bnt arc aiwavs sccially fiite,'ecl {{;yne.;-
rawicz i995: 1i81.
'fhe main aim of this articie is to describe the processes ancl factors that produce
science's cognitive closure to the world. What is of interest is the manner in which
scieirtific knowleclge may legitimize itself independently of the results of observatiols
anci experiments" The autopoiesis of cognitive systems will be treated here not as
a theoretical assumption, but as a category requiring empirical exemplification. The
basic perspective of the essay is that of the sociology of scientific knowledge (further
SSK) lsee Kaorr-Cetina, Mulkay (ed.) 1983]. This discipline was initiated by the
Strong Programme fBloor 1991: 7] of the Edinburgh School fsee Barnes, Bloor,
Henry 19961, which postulated that sociology should explain not oniy the context of
science (as had been done previously) bui also its content. The Edinburgh School
paved the way for successive waves of sociological studies of science, such as: (1) the
ethnography of laboratory practice [Knorr-Cetina ].981, 1983, 1999; Lynch 1985] and
the anthropology of science [Latour 1987; Latour, Woolgar 1979], {2) the sociological
analysis of scientific discourse [Gilbert, Mulkay 1984], and (3) the Bath School's
Ernpirical Programme of Relativism (EPOR) [H. Collins 1983, 1985; Collins, Pinch
I99Ba,1998bl.
{n the first part of the text I reconstruct the processes and factors that often cause
scientific knowledge to be constituted and to persist independently of objective reality,
exterior influences on science, or "empirical" data. The second part of the essay is
an extensive case study of a self-legitimizing scientific hypothesis. It pertains to the
debate over the cause of AIDS in the years 1982-1986. As we shall see, the causal
relation between HIV and AIDS, which is universally accepted today, was constituted
in the absence of experiments, observations, or other premises recognized as definitive
scientif,c proofs by the standards of the discourse itself.
The SSK Perspective on the Cognitive Closure of Scientific Discourses
The Duhem-Quine Thesis
Let us begin by referring to the Duhem-Quine thesis, known also as the underdeter-
mination thesis. Willard Quine claimed that our scientiflc knowledge is like a fleld
of force whose boundary conditions are experience. The fleld as a whole is so un-
determined by these boundary conditions that there is much latitude of choice as to
what staternents to reevaluate in the light of any singie contrary experience. Particu-
lar elements of the field can be readjusted in order to make them fit each other and
eliminate conflicts [cf. Quine l95l:42-43]. According to Pierre Duhem, theoretical
explanations and experience can be rnade to fit each other not only by changing the
logicalvalue of individual claims or the rules of logic. As he showed using the example
of astronomy, when observation is incompatible with theory, one can revise (1) the
astronomical theory, (2) the law of the propagation of light in spacer or (3) the theory
explaining how the instrument (in this case, the telescope) works [cf. Duhem 1905].
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This ieads tc a situaiion where experience and thecry are tna{ie to fit eerch other and
tlrus create a certain closed, mutualiy confirrrring, whole [cf. F{ackin g 1992; cf. robLrst
1it, Pickering 19951" Ian Flacking{199z] showed that experience can be frtted to theory
through a change in the theory, an auxiliary hypothesis concerning the functioning of
the instrument, and/or the rebuitding of the instrument itself or possibiy a change in
the way it is utilized.
The underdetermination of scientiflc knowledge by the objective world does not
lead to the cognitive closure of systems. But this obseryation makes us aware of how
long scientists can stick to their position in the face of the most varied evidence and
how rnuch freedom they have in adapting experience and the theory at their disposal.
The ernpirical experience is inseparably connected with scientific theory-there is no
pilre experience, because atrl experience is categofized within a.particular theoretical
framework and the use of a scientific instrurnent is based on a number of tacit or
explicit assumptions.
Black Boxes and the Costs of R.eplication of Experiurents
Much more interesting from the perspective of our analysis are the mechanisms as-
sociated with the "economy" of scientific research and the costs of replication of
experiments. dmong the elements ensuring the stability of scientific findings are the
unusually high costs of certain scientific experiments. The replication of research is
frequently so costly that researchers will not undertake it. (An exception is a situ-
ation.where the results of a given experiment do not agree with other elernents of
the discourse, i.e., with the results of competing research teams or theoretical predic-
tions). Let us consider the following example of research on the thyrotropin-releasing
hormone (TRH) conducted by the Salk Institute [see Latour, Woolgar 1.979; cf. Hack-
ing 1999: 1751. At the tirne, there was not a large-enough quantity of TRH samples
available to be used for laboratory analysis. In order to get the one microgram of
the substance that the Salk Institute needed to perforrn its original research, five
tons of pigs' brains were transported on ice from a slaughterhouse in Chicago to the
laboratory in San Diego and samples of TRH were extracted. No laboratory could
afford an analogous enterprise exclusively for the purpose of confirming the results
achieved by the Salk Institute. These types of expenditures are justified only in the
case of pioneering work. Obviously, not all natural science disciplines require similar
expenditures. Even so, for scientists the rational choice would seem to be to continue
and develop research work that already exists and not to contest or undermine other
work, with the possibility of becoming ernbroiled in long-lasting controversy. It is
more profitable to treat those results as a kind of black box.
The term "black box," which is taken from cybernetics, functions in SSK as some-
thing more than a loose metaphor. In this paper, by "black box" I mean every object
that constitutes a stable construct [see Latour l9B7:1-3]. A black box rnay be (1-) an
effectively operating technological artifact, (2) a standardized, rcpeatable experi-
ment, or (3) an established scientiflc claim constituting an entry point for further




eritities arid l;se tiiem in iheir reseaich woik, "iluilcling Lipoil them" si;icessil,e exper-
intents, iechnology, or concoptions. Tdeas, experiments, cLlserualions, or conceptiolrs
treated as a biack box can beccme an eierrient of a broader theoretical framework or
be treated as an auxiliary hypothesis explaining holv a particular instrument r,vorks;
equipment considered to be a biack box can be used as afl element of a larger tech-
nological systern or a complex experimental set. In many instances, the process of
closing a scientific black box consists in rejecting knowledge about the process of its
construction [cf. I-atour 1987: 5-7]. A black box can be deflned in categories of the
costs of its potential opening (problemairzing) [Sojak 2004:238-244). Theoretically,
there is always the possibility of opening a black box, but most often no one undertakes
such a task because of the high costs. Biack boxes are stabiiized not only by various
kinds of interests, convictions, and practices, but prirnarily by the process of building
successive layers or levels of btrack boxes; attempting to open the bottom box would
entail dealing with the whole stack of boxes built on top of it [cf. Callon 1991].
Let us return to the problem of replication. The fundamental difficulty associated
with replication consists in the fact that it requires high experirnental skills. Often
the only method for ensuring the reproducibility or standardization of experiments
is the transfer of tacit knowledge.l Confirming the experimental results of another
laboratory or reproducing a non-standard device is not a trivial activity. It frequently
requires the researchers to repeat nearly the entire cognitive process, and it sometimes
leads to a situation where a satisfactory level of standardization for a given experiment
can be achieved oniy by engaging the same highly-skilled person to perform the task.
The differences in experimental fluency and "style" between laboratory researchers
and technicians can be so large that they generate unacceptable discrepancies in
the results of experiments [see Lynch 1985: 67-681. Furthermore, replication is not
only costly (it absorbs scarce research resources), but above all, time-consuming (it
requires recreating the resources of tacit knowledge). Primarily, however, a research
team must take into account the activities of other representatives of the research
field: If a given iaboratory were to concentrate on the replication of a particular,
uncontroversial research result, other scientific centers could, during the same period,
carry their projects forward, gaining the lead in access to grants and other sources of
research funds. To state the matter in slightly different words, researchers considering
the replication of an experiment or protofype must take into account the "costs" of
potentially lost benefits (cf. opportunity costs).2
I Harry Collins 11974, 1985: 51-78] analyzed attempts to replicate a certain type of laser (a TEA
laser) by a research team. The device had been developed earlier in another research facility. The team
he observed had at its disposai a detailed description and full documentation of the laser. These were
insufficient, however. During the course of work a series of difficulties appeared that made reproduction
of this comparatively simple artifact impossible. Replication was achieved only after the team was joined
by a person who had participated in the work of the laboratory that had first constructed the device:
This person had the skill-based, embodied know-how necessary to build and operate the TEA laser. The
significance of tacit knowledge in scientific work was revealed by a sociological study of contemporary
laboratories engaged in designing and constructing thermonuclear arms [MacKenzi, Spinardi 1995].
2 This type of analysis in categories of cost calculations and of market-type mechanisms, presenting the
image of science without romance, can be found, in the works of Pierre Bourdieu [19881, Philip Kitcher
[1993, 2001] and Jesiis Zamora-Bonilla fsee: Ferreira, Zamora-Bonilla 2006;Zamora-Bonilia 2006,2010].
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Tfue Grgaeaieatioe? efl scieratific ft.esearcla and tile clc;sa:re +f g9ack Boxes
in connection with stepiran Fuch's theory of scientific knowledge production iFuchs1992' 1993], an organizational rnociel of science can be formulated that appears vaiidfor many contemporary research fields, especially in the case of research fronts. Theterm "research front" refers to a field in which the most expensive and scarcestresearch resources and the most taiented scientists ar€ concentratecl. These fields arecharacterized by a high degree of task uncertainty: the methodology and research
techniques have yet to be worked out, the research object underut"iy is jusr beingconstituted, and the scientists are functioning in conditions of g..ui u*ertui.ty as tothe possibility cf achieving their research airns. Above all, however, we are dealing
here with a high degree of social control and mutual clependence of researchers.
R'esearchers functioning within the framework of research fronts are subjected
to strong social control from the rest of their scientiflc cornmunity, where: (1) con-ducting experimental research within the comrnunify and writing credible reports
requires access to expensive scientiflc resources (instrurnents, rare sampies); (2) con-trol over resources is at the disposal of co-researchers and the institutions financing
and overseeing the research (reviewers of grant applications are most often other
researchers); and (3) cognitive success is dependent on whether scientific theses are
positively received and further developed or applied by the rernaining representatives
of a given discipline (they can reproduce it in their work, making it more stable). The
more expensive or difflcult to access the research resources are, the greater the extent
of mutual control that researchers have over each ottrer's work [cf. Fuchs Igg2, Igg3].A high degree of reciprocal social control irnposes methodological and theoretical
discipline. A researcher's failure to recogni ze andjoin the main trend of research (for
instance, by formulating an excessively innovative thesis that does not correspond
with the categories and expectations of the reviewer) could meet with a denial of
further research financing, which could hinder access to other research resources
(a vicious circle can be created-the lack of funds for research leads to a lack of
credible scientific results, which leads to difficulties in acquiring funds for research).
At the sarne time, research concentrated on new types of problems is related to ac-
cess to greater advantages and scientific capital, i.e., higher scientific prestige, which
can facilitate the obtaining of grants, publication in prestigious journals, access to
advanced scientific equipment, or personnel with the highest qualifications. In condi-
tions of high mutual dependence, any scientiflc disputes are relatively quickly resolved
by cutting off the resources necessary for research; rogue scientists, apostate trends
or alternative scientiflc schools are most often eliminated. Attempts to break out of
the paradigm preclude the realization of private research aspirations (which-it can
be supposed-are rather high in very dynamic research areas).
In conditions of high mutual dependency, the winning strategy is to develop pre-
vious research effects and not to attempt any scientific coup or undermining of the
achievements of others. Replicating test results orbecoming embroiled in controversy
also appears to be unprofitabie. Inpursuing thewinning strategy, scientists build their
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rnto black boxes. Cogniiive effort becomes clianneled. R.esearchers focus on resoivillg
sticcessive probtrerns; they fiii in the g;rps lire sarne paradigm and when they have fin-
ished with it they move on to othei research frelds, where as yet untapped resources
and sources of credit ain'ait them. Randall Collins caiis this model.of scientific re-
search "high-consensus, rapid-discovery science" [R.. Coliins 1994, 1998: 523-569].
Of course, not ali disciplines function in accordance with this model. For example,
some disciplines, particularly social sciences and humanities are not heavily reliant on
rare research resources, which would enforce the researchers' dependency; the result
is that controversial research is not as effectively closed or converted into a black box
as in the natural sciences. In such conditions, incommensurable, parallel paradigrns
can develop, because researchers do not have the rneans of social control by which to
discipline one another.
Even in the case of scientific disciplines requiring rare and costly research re-
sources, the above organrzational mechanisms sometimes fail and expensive contro-
versies arise. What is important, however, is that rapid-discovery science acts in such
a manner that the knowledge produced is rapidiy rnade unverifiable. The rnode of fi-
nancing and evaluating researchers means that they are not inclined to verify researctr
results. The certainty of scientific knowledge is not the effect of its corroboration, but
of the process of rapidly closing and "stacking" black boxes. Instead of a critical ap-
proach, we are dealing here with a high level of rnutual trust among the members of
the research communify. The dynamic of research fronts effectively raises the costs
of any possible deconstruction or controversy.
All this does not, however, lead us to statements about the possibility of a cognitive
closure of science-one more step is necessary. We have to rernember about the
arnbiguity of results [cf. Fleck 1979; Lynch 1985; Knorr-Cetina 1981] and the high
task uncertainty characteristic of many research fields, in particular those where
knowledge is still being constituted and research rnethods are being institution alized.
Bearing this in mind, we obtain the modei of a cognitive systern that quickly turns
the outcorne of rnicro-negotiation occurring at the level of individual laboratories (to
the degree they enter into the paradigm and do not stand in opposition to scientific
assumptions) into a black box and stabilizes it through the effect of superimposition.
In addition, we should remember the observations of Duhem and Hacking: Even if
scientists are faced with an anomaly, a contradiction, or the necessity of revising an
assumption, they have a range of techniques at their disposal for unifying fields of
knowledge and avoiding cognitive dissonances.
An excellent exernplification of such processes is provided by studies of scientific
controversies conducted by the Edinburgh School and the Bath School. Researchers
rivaling one another in a controversy often refer to the same set of data, interpreting
it to the advantage of the theory they are defending, or may function in two mutually
incommensurate fields, working on the basis of different assumptions, knowledge, and
instruments. Similarly, the choice itself of observations and the selection of test sarn-
ples is directed by the hypotheses adopted. A situation often occurs where disputes
can not be resolved on the basis of experimental results or observations: "Empirical
fact" proves inconclusive. The closure of the controversy is achieved by such social
{
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mechanisrns as, among others, cuttiirg oif flnanciai support, exclusion fron the i:rain-
stream discourse, breaking off social ties, or even cliscrecliting particuiar researchers
fsee, for instance: Barnes, Bloor, F{eirry 1996:18-45; H. Collins 1gB3,20aB; collins,
Pinch 7998a; Latour 7983,1988; i-yirch 1985; Pickeriiig 1gS1]. Tliere is no roorn here
to evoke the research of the Bath or Edinburgh schocls. i therefore propose to {bcus
on a single example that is a good illustration not only of the formation of a scien-
tiflc black box, but also of cognitive closure and the autonomization of the scientific
discourse from the empirical input.
A Case Study: the Scientific Discoufse on the Cause of I{IV/AIDS (19S1-19g0;:
The object of the case study is the scientific debate in the years 1981-1986 concerning
the cause of AIDS and the process of converting the retrovirus hypothesis (the claim
that the retrovirus4 HIV causes AfDS) into a stable btack box. At the beginning of
ttre 1980s, when puzzling cases of illness among homosexuals began to be observed,
explanations taking into consideration an infectious agent were considered unlikely.
The syndrome was linked, above all, with the lifestyle of the risk group: The focus
was on the intensive use of intravenous drugs, promiscuity, and the "fast" lifestyle
among American homosexuals. It was only after a series of negotiations that it was
possible to link the syndrome with a retrovirus. As we will see, legitimation of the
retrovirus hypothesis occurred in the absence of, and independently of, empirical
research. The discourse about AIDS constitutes an ideal example of the autopoietic
cornmunication system; it displays the self-production mechanisms of discourse in an
almost pure form.
Two important issues should be emphasized here. First, the explanation of AIDS
as an illness caused by FIIV is an unusually strongly stabilized cognitive construct. It is
reproduced and maintained, among other things, by medical practices that prernise the
detection and care of seropositive persons, ongoing medical research into HIV/AIDS
and methods of preventing or cornbating it, references in the public discourse to the
phenomenon, and widespread education on the subject of HIVIAIDS. The whole
network of organizations that have formed around the assertion of a link between
a specific retrovirus and AIDS should not be forgotten. Second, the acceptance and
universal recognition of the relation between FIIV and AIDS led to deep cultural,
social, political, and even economic, transformations. Above all, sexual practices and
mutual relations between partners underwent thorough changes. HIV/AIDS was re-
3 There is a large body of sociological literature on the scientific discourse on the cause of HIV/AIDS
and the later scientific controversy around the dorninant theory [see Altman 1986, 1994; Epstein 1995,
1996,1997; Fujimura, Chou 1994; Murray, Payne 19BB; Tieichler 1988a,1988b,799I,1992; Patton 1985,
1990; see also Collins 2000]. The article refers mainly to Steven Epstein's book Impure Science [Epstein
1996], which most completely describes the discourse and controversy around AIDS to the year 1995.
4 Retroviruses are a family of viruses whose genetic material is contained in RNA. They conduct a process
of reverse transcription: Thanks to enzymes called reverse transcriptase (or revertase) they transfer their
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peateCiy usecl as a resoufce in icleological disputes: for instance, in the context oi
famiiy vaiues. The issues relaied to the epidemic wele cf unusuaii.l elevatecl signifl-
cailce in the context of the functioning of homosexual inilieus and other :'isk grouprs
and the inanner in whictr they were perceived. It shoulcl be emphp.$ized that as a re-
suit of social pressure to hasten drug approvals, the representatirJes of risk groups
and infected persons were in a position to shape the very process $f clinical trials in
the USA, which had a far-reaching impact on the global pharmacerftical market fsee
Epstein 1995, 1996, 19971. Finally, HIV/AIDS is unusually import{nr in rhe conrexr
of the situation of third world countries; very often the probiems $f these areas are
analyzedthrough the prisrn of the HIV/AiDS epidemic, and this afflpcts the nature of
actions taken.
If we consider the above two observations, itwould appear that
tutes, at least from the sociological perspective, an extrerne case.
uation where such an importani scientific finding, whose result is usually strongiy
maintained, was arrived at independently of ernpirical tests-it wa
meclianisrns of the discourse itself. I-et us examine. therefore. the
only the relation between HIV and AIDS was constituted, but also
IV/AIDS consti-
re we have a sit-
the effect of the
ay in which not
epidemic itself.
From the "Los Angeles Five" to AIDS5
The Los Angeles Five and the Enigmatic Syndronte
From the SSK perspective, the beginning of the epidemic can be nsidered the an-
nouncernent by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention ( that a new,
enigmatic syndrome had been observed in five patients in Los An es [see Morbidity
and Mortality Weekly Repori no. 30 (5 June 19Bi): 25A-2521. The tients were di-
agnosed with pneumocystosis (Pneumocystis carinii pneumonia, I, a pneumorua
caused by an atypical fungus. Two died. The micro-organism ca ng PCP appears
everywhere, but in normal conditions, the human imrnune system is pable of dealing
with it. Two hypotheses were put forward. The first linked the ing cases of PCP
with the fact that all the patients were active homosexuals. The d announced
that the contasion could be connected with some sort of venereal isease. In alarm,
the CDC personnel began to seek analogous cases of insufficient i unity or oppor-
tunistic infection.6 Not long after, 26 further cases of mysterious illn ss were reported
(20 in New York and 6 in California). The victims were young ho als suffering
frorn Kaposi's sarcoma, arate type of cancer usually diagnosed in t
4 of the patients had PCP at the same time, B died.
elderlv. At least
The public media began to report on the strange cases (among
New York Times, and the l,{ew York l{ative, a gay cornmunity periodi
her papers, the
). They quoted
the stance of the doctors, according to whom the epidemic coul have somethine
5 Reconstruction mainly after Epstein 1996.
6 Opportunistic infection is an endogeneous infection characteristic of individual with diminished im-
munity (in humans, it is chiefly caused by HIV). The pathogenic factors producing rtunistic infections
(viruses, bacteria, fun gi,protozoa) are most often not a threat to persons with normall Iunctlonrns lmmune
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to do with an overlcacl cf the patients' inlniune systerns through the accumrilatic*of nurnerous venereai diseases, intravenous drugs use, or the popular ,,poppers,,7
faccording to F'pstein 1996: 46-471.After suoceeol]ng reports, the epidemrc graduzrlly
became a social fact that various social groups, insJitutions, and inciivicluals had to
take into account in their perception of the *oito. By the end of 19g1 a whole series ofarticles had appeared in prestigious medical journals such as the Nbw England1ottntal
o.f Medicine (NEJM), which presented new information and speculations concerning
the unknown illness' There was no doubt that a nationwide epidemic of immune
deficiency was occurring. However, it was not known what causec the immunological
impairment, how contagion was brought about, or what environmental f'actors came
into play' Reports that the illness was not restricted to homosexuals started to flow in.
8% of the 159 cases recorded at the time were heterosexuals, including one woman.
R'eports also began to appear of afypical cases of PCP in persons ,rsilg intravenous
drugs (7 cases).
A new disease' or an epidemic itsetf, was not something that irnposed itself on
researchers-the cases of illness to that time were classified within the framework of
existing epidemiological categories. From the SSK perspective, without the actions
of the CDC and collaborating doctors, the epidemic would not so much have existecl
unnoticed but would nct have constituted itself as a separate entity. That people fall
ill and die is an obvious, "natural" social fact. However, what people fall ill and die of
is the result of social negotiation. In this sense illness, medical conditions, contagions,
and epidemics are perfonned by medicine. It is scientific and medical institutions
that provide the content of various diseases'definitions [see, for example, Fleck lg]g,
Foucault 1994;Mol20A2; Mol, Law 1994,20041.
From Immune Overload to the Virus Hypothesis
In spite of the above reports, attention was stiil focused on homosexuals and their fast-
paced lifestyle. Homosexuality-it was reasoned-was as old as the world, while what
was at hand was a new syndrome, and thus a new factor or factors must be at play.
Increasingly often, hypotheses were formulated about an overload of the immune
system. The syndrome was linked with "excesses" (drug abuse, the consumption of
"poppers") and the "promiscuity" (viral infection, venereal diseases, and the strong
medicines used to combat these conditions) generally attributed to sexually liberated
homosexuals. It was conjectured that "life in the fast lane" destroyed the immune
system and resulted in opportunistic infections. At the beginning of l9L2,the disease
was increasingly often being described by doctors as GRID-Gay-Related Immune
Deficiency. In this way, the initial conceptual framework for explaining the cause and
controlling the epidemic was formed.8
7 'Poppers" is a term for various alkyl nitrates. The name was taken from the sound made from opening
the hermetic packaging of these drugs. Among other purposes, they are inhaled to increase sexual pleasure.
In the early 80s it was rather generally considered that they suppressed the organism's immunify.
8 The main characteristic of a conceptual framework is that it organizes our experience and discourse.
By cieflnition, GRID was supposed to be an illness of homosexuals. Doctors had difficulty in acknowledging
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i{oilcsexuai communities quictrrly reiicied ta this ciisadyaratagfoiis cle{rnilion ci
the situation by trying io c,uesiion the ccnnection between the syilclrcme zrncl ihei:
lifestyle. The medical profession was accused of homophobia and hetero-sexism.
As eariy as 7982, gays aiid lesbians began to arganize foundations and associations
whose aim was to help persons affected by the syndroare, but aiso, above all, to
engage in political and media activities to shape the ciefinition of the new illness and
the homosexual image. Partially under the influence olhomosexual communities and
doctors who sympathized with thern, the rnedicai community rejected the politically
incorrect name "GRID." trt was replaced by the more neutral terrn AIDS, or Acquired
Immunodefi ciency Syndrome.
The transition frorn the paradigm of immune overload to the virus hypothesis oc-
curred in 1982 and 1983. In 1983 there were reports of AIDS outside the United States.
AIDS cases were discovered in 33 countries, on each of the inhabited continents. This
information was published in all the prestigious medical journals, such as the lr],EJM
and the Lcrncet. Among 29 cases noted in Franee,6 patients had developed the syn-
drome in June I9BI, that is, before the first news of the epidemic in the USA fsee
Epstein 1996:55-55]. Tire inforrnation was a turning point. Tire previous conceptual
framework organizing perceptions of the epidernic was repealed, making it possible
to notice cases of the syndrome falling outside the original risk group. On July 9, 1983,
the CDC announced 34 cases of Kaposi's sarcorna and other opportunistic infections
among F{aitians triving in 5 different American states and arnong hernophiliacs who
had intravenously received Factor VIII-a hematogeneous substance acquired by
mixing the plasma of blood collected from a thousand donors. e According to some
researchers, the transmission of AIDS was reminiscent of contagion by hepatitis B.
Not only was this observation an argurnent in favor of the virus hypothesis, but it con-
stituted the basis for formulating the first preventive measures (the use of disposable
needles, lirnitation of the number of sexual contacts/partners) [Epstein 1,996 63]. The
hypothesis of "one virus-one epidemic" shortly came to dominate.
This does not mean, however, that voices of skepticisrn did not appear. However
quicklythevirus hypothesis dominated the discourse, the immune overload hypothesis
still had a group of adherents. The rnain actor here was Joseph Sonnabend. He argued
that it was not very likely that one and the same illness should appear suddenly in
four entirely different groups (Haitians, intravenous drug addicts, hemophiliacs, and
homosexuals). He claimed that it could be a matter of four differing syndromes charac-
teized only by similar symptoms [see Sonnabend, Witkin, Purtilo 1983]. Sonnabend,
however, was not an epidemiologist. In the absence of credible research and data,
his work was treated as scientific speculation. The remaining researchers defending
the paradigm of immune overload began to be seen in a similar light. During the first
but who were diagnosed with immunosuppression were suspected of hiding their true sexual preferences.
There was resistance to broadening the extent of the epidemic to narcotics users with immunosuppression.
Reports by pediatricians of observing imrnune deficiency in chiidren were considered incredible.
e The CDC suggested that it might be a matter of the transmission of some infectious element in human
blood. Since Factor VIII had been purified of bacteria. it was oossible that there was a virus involved
[Epstein 1996:56-571.
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Twa yaarc cf the epidernrc not much research appezr.rect tirat woulci siipsurt siich an
approach.
R.etrovirology: I-AV and tl'te "Iliscove,rv" o.i HTLV^III
The factor causing AIDS turned out to be HTLV-III, a retrovirus whose discovery
was originally ascribed to Robert Gallo of the National Cancer Institute (l{CI;.ttt
Gallo's attention was directed to AIDS by James Curran of the CDC, who rnade
the tearn from the NCI acquainted with the epidemiclogical reports and with his
opinion that the cause of the syndrome'was an infectious element. He pointed out
that a characteristic of the syndrorne was a lowered level of T lymphocytes. This
inclined Gallo to take into consideration the hypothesis that the cause of AIDS was
HTLV or another virus of that famiiy. Galio's assistant found the retrovirus in the
T lyrnphocytes of several AIDS patients. Gallo reported his discovery in the pages of
Science magazine. A succeeding article about traces of HTLV infection was written
by his colleague, Myron Essex of the Harvard School of Public Heaith.
Tests of the lyrnphoid tissues of AIDS patients were aiso conducted by Luc Mon-
tagnier's team at the Pasteur Institute in Paris. The French team prepared T lym-
phocyte samples and bred the virus. Changes in the level of enzyme indicated that
the virus had killed the cells and the presence of reverse transcriptase pointed to its
being a retrovirus. By adding fresh cells, the French researchers were able to maintain
the culture, and thanks to an electron rnicroscope they could photograph the virus.
Montagnier contacted Gailo to inform hira of his discovery. Gallo encouraged the
French virologist to report his discovery in Science. The articles by Gallo, Essex, and
Montagnier were to appear simultaneously on May 2A,1983 fsee Barr6-Sinoussi et al-
1.983; Essex et. al L983; Gallo et al. 1983]. In reading them together, one could have
the irnpression that the virus testecl by Gallo was the same as that of which Montag-
nier was writing. However, the French scientists did not share this opinion. The tests
had not conflrmed that the "French virus" belonged to the HTLV family (the virus
destroyed T lymphocytes, whereas HTLV caused them to multiply violently, leading
to cancer). In September 1983, in Cold Spring llarbor, Montagnier announced that
the virus called LAV (tymphadenopathy-associated virus), which had been noted by
his team, was found in 6A% of patients with lymphadenopathy (recognized to be the
phase preceding AIDS) and2\Vo of patients with AIDS. None of the patients tested
was infected with HTLV.
Gallo received from Montagnier a sample of LAV for testing. Shortly thereaft
he announced the discovery of another virus in the HTLV family. He maintai
that HTLV-III was the cause of AIDS. In January 1"985, however, it was found th
HTLV-II was characterizedby a99% genetic similarity to LAV. The viruses we
too similar to come from different sources-obviously the virus discovered at t
Pasteur Institute had found its way into Gallo',s sample. It remains an open
10 Robert Gallo achieved renown as the co-discoverer of the retrovirus producing T-cellleukernia, 
a
forrn of cancer. The viruswas named Human T-Cell Leukemia Virus, HTLV for short. 
In 1982, he man
to find a succeeding virus of the same farnily, which-he maintainecl-produced another type of leukem
The viruses were narned HTLV-I and HTLV-II.
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wheiher this occurreci by acci{ient {the aduiteration of-samples is a comn:on prob1ei:l iir
micro-biological laboratories) or wheiher Gallo was guiity of cieception.11 Flowever.in 1984, this was not yet known. It is an unusually important point, because for
many researchers tire inclependent cliscovery c;f the same virus in sampies by two
different research centers would testify in fzLvcr of the reirovirud hypothesis. These
two apparently independent scientific announcernents nautually strengthened ancl
iegitimized one another. Itwas one of the faciors that allowecl the retrovirus hypothesis
to acquire broad support in the scientific world, ancl the later revelation of the error
could no longer damage the already partially ciosed black box.
Tlte Heckler-Gallo Press Conference cnd Pttblication in Science
In 1984 another very important event took place: a press conference on April 23
otganized by Margaret Heckler, then Secretary of Health and Fiuman Services in the
Reagan administration. Standing with Roberf Gallo before a room full of reporters
she announced that "The probable cause of AIDS has been found: a variant of
a known human cancer virus, called HTLV-fiI" [according to Epstein 1,996: i2]. (An
analogous report appeared in the public press, inclucling in the New york Tim.es")
Heckler claimed that Gallo had managed to work out a method of reproducing the
virus, as was necessary to develop a blood test for antibodies. In announcing the results
of research publiciy instead of publishing them in the pages of a reviewed scientific
magazine, the Fleckler-Gallo conference constituted a drastic violation of scientific
etiquette. Publication occurred only on May 4, Ig34 when as many as four articles
by Gallo and his team appeared in Science [Gallo et al. 1984; popovic et al. I9B4;
Sarngadharan et aL.1984; Schupbach et. al. IgB4). Taking advantage of the situation,
Gallo put for',vard a series of hypotheses ref'erring to the connection between HTLV-
III and AIDS and possible tests for the presence of the virus in blood. In Science Gallo
reported that he had managed to find and isolate the virus in the following cases: in
18 among 21 samples taken from patients in whom "lymphadenopathy syndrome,,
(recognized to be a phase preceding the real syndrome) had been found; in 3 arnong
4 mothers of juvenile patients with AIDS; in 3 of B juvenile patients with AIDS; in
13 among 43 adult patients with AIDS who had been confirmed as having Kaposi,s
sarcorna; and finally, in 1"0 among 2l adultpatients with AJDS who hacl opportunistic
infections. It might have been expected that HTLV-III would be present in each of
the cases tested. Gallo considered, however, that most likely the test samples were
not treated in the optimal manner for that particular virus. What is important is that
clinically healthy persons were not found to have the virus.
According to the discourse at that time, this data did not yet prove that HTLV-trII
produces AIDS; it only showed the correlation between AIDS and the presence of the
virus (or more precisely, its antibodies, as it was these the tests detected). It remained
1i Finally, in 1985, the Pasteur Institute sued the US government. The suit concerned the patent rights
for the test for retrovirus antibodies. In7987, Jacques Chirac and Ronald Reagan signed an agreernent
dividing the royalties for the commercial antibodies test between their countries. In 1991, after it emerged
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ail opeil quest;cn whether the virus was the prirnary cause of ATDS or only anoiSer
opportunistic infection--an innocent "free rider" virus. FiTLV-llI was tjreoreticaliy.
supposed to destroy T lyrnphocytes in humans. trt was nor knowil rvhether it actually
did so itz 'litto. The in vitro experiments with T lymphocytes ancl the virus seerned to
confirm the theory, but the laboratory results were insufficient for the findines to be
conclusive on the subject of the causal relationship.
Another researcher, Jay L.W, also sought the virus causing AIDS. In August
1984 he reported in Science ll-er.y et al. 1984] that he had managed to find rraces of
a retrovirus, which he called A{DS-associated retrovirus (ARV), in around half the
AIDS patients he tested, in around 20% of. clinically healthy homosexuals, and in
scarcely 4% of healthy heterosexuals. Later, Levy's virus was pronounced identical
wiih FITLV-Ifi.
In 1986, in the face of such a large number of names and acronyms (LA! HTLV-
III, ARV HTLV-III ILAY) the International Comrnittee on 'Iaxonomy of Viruses
decided on a compromise name for the virus that-as it was then believed-caused
AIDS. It was called HI! i.e., F{uman trmmunodeficiency Vrus. This event consti-
tuted a certain stabilization point, or even an institutionalization of the retrovirus
hypothesis. By that time, the syndrome, the virus hypothesis, and the epidernic itself
had becorne stable elernents of the social situation. The issues related to them were
repeatedly raised in the pages of widely read newspapers and scientific journa.ls. They
were continually present in the news. They became a factor that politicians, medical
practitioners, scientists and ordinary people had to consiCer, systematically, in their
activities. At the same time, a whole new set of institutions focused on AlDS-related
issues developed: specialist journals, research institutions, and grassroots initiatives
of the gay community. In the years 1984-1986, the retrovirus hypothesis acquired
universal acceptance in the scientific community, in the rnedia, and in everyday dis-
course.
The Genesis of Proof, i.e., the Self-reference of Discourse Concerning HIV/AIDS
The Heckler-Gallo conference and the publication of four texts in Science by Gallo's
team triggered sudden interest in the retrovirus. In the discourse, the signiflcance of
publications on the subject of the imrnune overload hypothesis declined. Meanwhile,
the subject of the virus was increasingly often raised: In 1983, articles on the subject
constituted only ZVo of the entire press on AIDS while in L986 they were 37Vo (nearly
2000 publications appeared). Simultaneously, from month to month, the retrovirus
hypothesis became increasingly less problematical and in tirne achieved the status of
a black box. Why, however, did the retrovirus hypothesis gain pfimacy?
The Truth-Wilt-Out Device: Did the Truth Come Ottt?
Did the retrovirus hypothesis begin to be generally accepted just because "it was
true"? At the moment when knowledge is stabilized, scientists frequently make a re-
verse justification, explaining their own previous actions within the framework of the
losic of scientiflc discoveries. At the moment a staternent is stabilized, the final effect
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of research or conlroversy is pi"esenierl by- scientis'ls as an obvicus, "ilatutz'li" fact.
r,vhiclr was imposed from the outset lsee Fieck, 19197. They thus erase knowledge
concerning social negotiations, complicated research analyses, or the controversie-q
arounci amlriguous results that usually accompany the eI'llergence of netrr knowledge
[Latour 1957]. A close analysis of the statements of scieirtists reveals that they have
a tendency to mix together various disproportionate scientific explanations. Nigel
Gilbert and Michael Mulkay [1982] showed that scientists, in explaining cognitive
errors, tlre course of a controversy, and many other aspects of their work, make use
of two basic rhetorical repertoiies: the empiricist and the contingent. A scientist who
uses the first repertoire presents his activities and convictions as entirely natural, sug-
gesting that the obviousness of an empirical phenomenon will speak for itself fGilbert'
Mulkay t9B2:561. The contingent repertoire, on the other hand, consists in present-
ing activities and convictions as being to a fundamentai degree dependent on various
non-scientific factors fGilbert, Mulkay 1982:57]. In criticizing scientific conceptions,
the test subjects nlore often made use of the contingent repertoire, while in explaining
their own position they rnade use of the empiricist technique . Cognitive errors-or
at least, what was considered error-were most often explained using the contingent
repertoire. The situation was sirnilar in the case of scientific controversies. What is
important, howevetr, is that althoughboth types of rhetoricwould seem to be mutuaily
exclusive, scientists most often used them in reference to the salne problems- Often
theiz were mixed together in one statement. This generated contradictions requiring
mitigation. As a conversational analysis showed, when researchers switched frorn one
fype of explanation to another, a one or two-second break was sufficient to prevent
thern from noticing the dissonance. In analyzing the statements of the respondents,
Gilbert and Mulkay aiso caught more sophisticated techniques for mitigating or avoid-
ing conflict. One of the patterns of the discourse analyzedwas called the "truth will
out device" (TWOD) [see Gilbert, Mulkay 1982:1,09-71.; see also Sojak 2004:2271-
The scientists stated that in the research situations they described a large role was
played by outside considerations (social, cuitural, emotional, or organizatronal fac-
tors). They expressed the conviction, however, that time was in favor of substantive
factors. In otherwords, in spite of their perception of social and cultural determinants
of scientific knowledge, they considered that in the final account these do not influ-
ence the shape of conceptions and research findings. They claimed that time would
show which views were true. This is confirmed by the observations of other SSK
representatives. For example, Latour [1987] described research practice similarly.
Ue Aistlnguished science in its ready-made form from science in action. Established
knowledge is most often explained by scientists themselves by means taken frorn the
empiricist repertoire. Scientists more often draw from the contingent repertoire in
the case of knowledge that is only just being constituted. Furthermore, during a con-
troversy, researchers are more often described in categories of rationally calculating,
proflt-oriented, culture-determined or emotion-driven actors than as disinterested
cognitive entities guided by the logic of scientific discovery. It was no different in the
case of the HIVAIDS hypothesis. A good example is Gallo himself. In his opinion,
there was already enough data in the early yeals of the epidemic to support the virus
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explanaiion. Similar opinions wflre expresseciby oiher discilulse pariicipanis" ;\t the
sam€ tirne, the earlier approach was treated in categories of cognitive erroi., wh.icii
couici have been avoided by adherence to scientific raethod. In other larords, the dom-
inant approach was explaineii in the frarnework of the empiricist repertoire. On the
other hand, the contingent repertoire was used in reference to the rejected etiologies
of AIDS.
From the SSK perspective it is hard to consider such explanations satisfactory.
The principle of symmetry [tsloor 1991: 7] assumes that part of a conviction can nol
be explained by referring to an objective state of nature, while the rest is explained
in categories of errors, omissions, or social interests. Because a piece of knowledge
is considered obvious does not explain why it carne to be so considered. SSK studies
therefore often ignore or even challenge science's auto-presentation. Would it be
possible to formulate an explanation of the success of the retrovirus paradigrn without
reproducing explanations trased on the TWOD and reverse rationalization?
The Dense Network of Mtftual Citations and Positive Modalization
oi tlrc Retrovints Hypothesis
Paula Tieichler formulated the following hypothesis: A small group of scientists, con-
stantly quoting each other's work, quickly produced a dense network of reciprocal
citations and thus achieved very early control over the scientiflc discourse on AIDS
and its etiology-its nomenclature, publications on the subject, and invitations to
conferences [see Tieichler 1992:76]. Tleading the path pointed out by Tkeichler, the
subsequent statement can be risked: Through mutual citation of one another's wotk,
a group of scientists created a social sense that the retrovirus hypothesis they defended
was unproblematic; an external observer could corne to the conclusion that since there
was such a rich literature on the subject, the basic premise must be justified. This le-
gitimizing, retrovirus-hypothesis system based on a thickening network of internal
references among a closed circle of researchers was so effective that it did not require
additional support in the form of new scientific reports. Thanks to this, a staternent that
was originally regarded by its authors as comparatively unlikely and requiring further
research gradually acquired the status of objective truth without additional proofs.
Steven Epstein conducted a thorough analysis of the discourse around the cause
of AIDS. He analyzed the content of articles that appeared in seven of the leading
scientific journals in the years 1984-1986 and referred to Gallo's article on the causal
relationbetween HIV and AIDS published on May 4,1984inScience.In surn, Epstein
analyzed,244 articles, including 16 frorn Nature and 66 from Science. His study con-
centrated on the way in which Gallo's retrovirus hypothesis was referenced. Over half
(57.6%) of the texts he studied from l9B4 rcferred to the statement that a retrovirus
was the cause of AIDS, but only 3.4% of the texts openly referred to the statement
without reseryations. In 1985, 24.5% of texts already referred to Gallo's retrovirus
hypothesis openly and without reservations. Over half the texts (58.5Vo),however,
still referred to it reservedly. In 1986, scarcely one flfth of the texts (21.5 7o) retained
any reservations. As much as 627o of the analyzed works openly and unquestioningly
accepted Gallo's thesis [Epstein 1995: 79-704].
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l,4aniiestali*ris cf skep.iici,sfil cr aliern:rtive explanaticns of AiilS r,vere Linusuai!3,,,
rare in ilte tcsi sarnple. i2 in piactice, researchers i:ndelmining tlie dominant perspec-
iive had to expect sanctions from the scientific ccmmunity isee the case of Shyh-Ching
Lo; Epstein 1995: 92).ln sum, the authors referring to the ly'ray 1984 text in Science
addressed the ihesis of Gallo, Montagnier, or Levy with a greater or lesser degree of
acceptance . As tlie discourse developed, the retrovirus hypothesis was unconditionaliy
accepted with increasing frequency.
It is important that succeeding articles gradually reinterpreted the rneaning of
the eariier reports and analyses. More precisely, the later articles ascribed stronger
staternents concerning the causal relationship to the earlier publications than the
authors of the cited texts had been in a position to make. F"or example, in 19B5,
Science contaiaed a textwritten by several epidemiologists frorn the CDC, who stated
in the introduction that the retrovirus named HTLV-III, known also asARV and LAV,
had been isolated ayear earlier and shown to be the cause of AIDS. A similar group
of researchers from the Virology Department of the Food and Drug Administration
wrote in 1985 that the role of HTLV-III in the development of AIDS had been firmly
established. In the opinion of the authors of both texts, Montagnier, Gallo, and Levy
had already proved it in their texts faccording to Epstein 1996: 83]. However, at this
stage, the claim of a reiationship between F{IV and AIDS constituted only the most
likely thesis, not a proven and recognrzed scientific fact. None of the texts the authors
referenced (or any of the 244 articles analyzed by Epstein) gave conclusive proof of
the HIV/AIDS hypothesis.13 Furthermore, the cited authors themselves did not claim
that they had formulated anything that could be taken as proof of a causal relationship
between HIV and AIDS.
We are dealing here with what Latour described as processes of adding, delet-
ing or changing modalities. Scientists address the claims of their fellow researchers
with various types of modalities, both positive-"it is true that x," "x has important
theoretical consequelss"-2n61 negative-"it is doubtful whe th er x," "it is impossible
thatx," "it seems to the authors that x." Fositive modalities shift the claim away from
the conditions of its formation and present it as an objective fact, removing all traces
iz Only one article, published in 1984, considered the possibility that the virus hypothesis could be
erroneous [Epstein 1996: 80-83]. In the Lancet, the Heckler-Gallo conference was criticized as a media
spectacle; a call was made for a rnore careful and sober appraisal of the available data. It was emphasized
that discovery of the virus in selected samples did not yet constitute proof of a causal relationship. Finally,
however, the Lancet editors, taking into account the fact that two laboratories had independently isolated
the same virus, were inclined to assume that it was this factor that was responsible for the epidemic (it was
not then known that Gallo's samples had been contaminated with LAV). A skeptical article and letters
aiso appeared in NEJM and in the Journal of tlte Ameican Medical Association (JAMA).In March 1985,
Luc Montagnier wrote carefully in IAMA on the subject of the pathogenesis of AIDS. A little later he
stated that some additional cofactor could participate in the development of AIDS: for instance, antigens
or foreign proteins. In other words, Montagnier tried to supplement his retrovirus hypothesis with certain
elements of the imrnune overload hypothesis [according to Epstein 7996: 841.
13 In writing about the lack of conclusive proofs or the paradoxes of the HIV/AIDS paradigm, I am not
referring to any external, "objective" standards of scientific research or philosophical conceptions on the
methodology of the natural sciences. I am not evaluating whether something can be considered a proof or
not, but oniy reconstructing, after Steven Epstein, the manner in which participants in ttrre given scientific
fieid treated their own research and how they qualified it.
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ihat it consiitiltes soffieone's ci eaticn. ldegative ilodalities evcke the conciitions in
which a given thesis was cieated--with thre result that it appears methodologicaliy
problematic or less objective fsee Latou r 198]:231. Anextremely'positive or negative
technique of modalization consists in passing over a given claim in silence. In the case
of an extremely negative reception, the thesis is greeted with a silence that means it
is so absurd as to be beneath notice. The most obvious facts are also not mentioned;
they are treated as manifest claims on which successive theses can be superimposed.
The process of superimposition rneans that the facts of the claim become an increas-
ingly stable black box. In the discourse analyzed by Epstein, we have such a situation:
The retrcvirus was positively modalized in various ways by the participants in the
discourse. It r,vas gradually transformed from a likely hypothesis into a proven fact.
For many, it became so obvious that it was not worth discussion.
During the time period under analysis, not much new information or research
appeared that could be recogntzed, on the grounds of the premises and standards
accepted in the said discourse, as evidence proving or giving plausibility to the initial
hypothesis of Gallo, L.ry, and Montagnier. Simultaneously, researchers were still
struggling with unresolved problems: (1) it had not been possible to isolate the virus
in half the patients who had developed the syndrome, (2) theoretically, the virus was
supposed to produce the syndrome when the T lymphocytes were attacked, but by
using the most sensitive of available methods, the researchers had been able to find
the virus only in an unusually small number of cells taken from a patient (sometimes
in scarcely one lymphocyte in 100,000), (3) the virus destroyed lymphocytes in vitro,
but in the case of living organisms, the effect was not as obvious-too small a number
of cells turned out to be infected, and (4) serological researchers were not able to
show that it was an invasion of the virus that produced immunosuppression [Epstein
1996 88-391. In addition, the HIV/AIDS hypothesis did not fulfill Koch's postulates.la
These postulates are astable element of the medical tradition and are used to exclude
the possibilify of blaming a disease on the wrong factor, for instance, a passenger
virus. The HIV/AIDS hypothesis did not meet the first and third postulate (the virus
was found in scarcely half the patients, and it was not possible to create an animal
model) [Epstein 1996: 88-90].
In spite of the above, the process of positive modalization of the retrovirus hy-
pothesis continued. In the years 1984-1986 all the problems and "paradoxes" of the
retrovirus hypothesis were viewed not as insurmountable barriers but as ordinary
anomalies. No other hypothesis was as well established or offered the prospect of
rapid containment of the epidemic. The HIV/AIDS paradigm held the hope that
tests, antiviral medications, and even a vaccine against HIV could be delivered in
a matter of years or months. In addition, the original works were layered over with
articles citing them. In effect, the HIV/AIDS relation began gradually to be seen not
1a According to Koch's postulates, for a given infectious element to be recognized as the cause of a disease,
(1) it shouid be found in every case of infection, (2) it should be isolated and bred in the form of a pure
culture, (3) the culture thus prepared should infect a susceptible laboratory animal, which should then














as a probabie hypothesis but as an obvious premise constiruting the starting pc;int for
further research. The discourse shaped in this way producecl the deep feeling that the
causal relationship must have breen ernpiricaily well grounded. In practice, howevel,
no work yet existed that could be recognized as a confirmation of the hypothesis.
A sirnilar situation existed in regards to the immune overload hypothesis; in that
case too no new research appeared to support the hypothesis. The difference consisted
in the fact that the overload hypothesis was rejected while the retrovirus hypothesis
was maintained, even though it did not generate, over a comparable tirne period,
conclusive scientific proofs. The lack of proof is an argument against a hypothesis
only and exclusively when a given research milieu has the will to raise the question.
The Self-legitimization o.f the Discottrse About AIDS
On the basis of Epstein's analysis, the hypothesis could be risked that the biornedical
discourse on the cause of AIDS functioned as a seif-referential systern. Its point of
reference was not so much an external reality (represented thanks to experimental
procedures and other research techniques) but its own elements, i.e., publications
and other scientific staternents. The discourse was not anchored in the world under
study-rather, the discursive system constituted the basis for defining an image of the
world and the medical definition of the syndrome.
Scientists, instead of referring to new research, chiefly cited the earlier-already
classical-research of Montagnier, Gallo, and L"ry, or one another. For example,
rnuch of Gallo's later work was conducted chiefly to systern atize the previous research;
it did not bring any qualitatively new data to the discourse [according to Epstein 1996:
86-87]. In this manner there arose, on a foundation of a few texts considered classical,
a dense and cohesive nefwork of authors and texts basing themselves on the practice of
rnutual citation. The system formed the basic legitimization of the thesis placed in the
discursive framework. In practice, individual texts referred to other texts as those that
constituted conclusive proof. Thus there arose a continuum of references and circular
citing [cf. Epstein 1996:87]. The authors referred to each other in a criss-crossing
manner as the ones who had provided final proof. On the other hand, a situation was
achieved where the first text was cited by others who treated it as a scientific proof,
while the text itself referred to other, more original, but not more conclusive, work.
The previous observations can be summarized in the following manner: The main
supports of the discourse were the classic, founding texts of Gallo, L"ry, and Montag-
nier. A network of mutual references was established on these works. However, the
process of positive modalization and imputation meant that the texts were viewed not
only as formulations but simultaneously as confirmations of the retrovirus hypothesis.
What is interesting here is the role that Gallo played in this discourse. A consid-
erable part of the literature analyzed by Epstein (a third of the texts that appeared
in 1984 and 1985 and a quarter of the texts in 1986) were works by Gallo, or his
colleagues, with whom he had earlier published on the subject of the retrovirus hy-
pothesis. Gallo's name or those of his colleagues were often to be found somewhere
in the middle or end of a long llst of co-authors. (In many cases, Gallo's role may
have been limited to the provision of research samples.) However, the channels for
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spreadriig Galio'.c idea in ihe rfiedicala*rlscieltihc co'mrnuility thrcr;gh pers$iliitr ties
or face-ic-face con'iacls are obvious here. Due to this nefwork of coatacts, Galio'*q
group coi,ild strengtlrel the status of the retroviri;s hypothesis in tire scientific clis-
course. At the saire time, they could iricrease their credibility simply by pub,lishing an
enormous quantity of material and continually referring to their own work.
Neither the deluge of iiterature on the subject of tiie retrovirus hypothesis nor the
process of shifting the modality are anything unusual and do not constitute a scien-
tific pathology. Similarly, in other areas, scientists seek to stabilize their hypotheses
through a flood of publications on a given subject. During the period when a large
literature on a subject is being created, a given phenomenon begins to be treated by
researchers as an objective element of their practice [see Latour 1987, t999]. F{ow-
ever, scientists are striving above all to persuade other researchers to build research
on their ciaims in order to stabilize them additionally. Where there is a high degree
of consensus around a hypothesis in spite of the lack of proofs, a process can occur
like this one, which increased the costs of questioning the retrovirus liypothesis.
A "Self-confinning Hypothesis" or the Facilitation of Scientific Proof
In the ye ars 7984-1986 there were not yet proofs (or what could pass tor proofs on the
basis of the prevailing methodological standards) of the retrovirus hypothesis-it was
confirrned only over the course of the following decade. Let us observe, however, that
there is an enormous difference between producing scientific proof in favorable social
conditions, when nearly the whole comrnunity (not only the scientific community)
expects confirmation of a given hypothesis, and attempts to legitimize the ciaim in
a situation where there is a lack of consensus or in conditions of fierce controversy.
In the first case, it is much easier to gain the interest of fellow researchers, favorable
reviews, or funds for research; in the second case, scientific opponents will constantly
subject the results of research and experiments to criticism, hampering both reference
to the results of experiments and observation, and the suppori of fellow researchers.
Even if it is possible for a research tearn to confirm a hypothesis satisfactorily, other
teams could just ignore the results, or prove incapable of replicating them in their
own laboratories (remember that the replication of innovative research requires time
to master the new technique and acceptance of the possibility that the result we are
trying to repeat is not simply an artifact).
Referring to Robert K. Merton [1948] we can state that we are dealing here with
a certain variety of social phenomenon known as the self-fulfllling prophecy. Appli-
cation of this concept to the process of closing a scientific controversy could seem
counter-intuitive. Let us elaborate this issue. As was shown above, the publication of
the papers by Gallo and his team in Science triggered processes that resulted in the
forrnation of the discourse based on a network of mutual positive citations. This in
turn created a widespread sense (inside and outside the scientific community), that
one was dealing with an established fact. The general sense of the truth of the retro-
virus hypothesis not only encouraged attempts to prove the hypothesis, but above
all facilitated their reahzation Simultaneously, the situation hindered the activities
of possible opponents, who had difflculties accessing research resources and were
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expose{i to sociai sanctions. Let us retuln, howe:ver, to the catflggry colneci bi/ Mer-
ton. A self-fulfilling prophecy is a sociai situation where the spread of a conviction
concerning the state of the worid causes people to begin to behave in such a {nanner
that in effect the existence of this state becomes more probable, even if the original
conviction was unfounded. The classic exainple is the spread of a prediction/rurnor
that a given bankwill go bankrupt in the near future. However, as Thomas C' Schelling
observed, in certain aspects, a better term for the phenomenon would be that of "self-
realizingexpectation.'; ;S"h"iling 1991: 38]. It is also more useful from the perspective
of the present anaiysis, It should be remembered that according to Merton's concep-
tualizaLtion, the claim aboul the state of the world triggering the change is originally
efroneous and becomes true only through the collective actions of people' In the
case of an analysis of a scientific claim's black boxing, one can not step outside 
the
discourse and state whether the thesis was true or not-there is no external instance
to which one could refer. What interests us is the relation between the expectations
of the scientists and the plocess of stabilizing a given hypothesis as an objective' 
in-
disputabre fact. I would also like to emphasize that I am not claiming that faith in
the accuracy of a hypothesis led automaticaliy to its legitimization' It is not only 
the
number of citations, brrt ulr" the results of experiments and scientiflc observations
that influence the status of the scientific claim [see the "blood flow" rnodel, Latour
1999:98-108J. I am only stating that to a large degree a general consensus and 
societal
expectations increase the probability of proofs being provided' This claim 
does not
imply, however, that the discovery ofptoott linking HIV to AIDS was only a matter'of
time. Rhetoric of "the truth will out'l type is fairly widespread among scientists' 
SSK
and STS make us look at the causes of closure not in the structure of 
unknown reality,
as yet unarticulated by scientific instruments, rneasurements, or experiments' 
but in
the actions of scientists themselves and other social groups. We can only 
ponder the
question: If the course of the debate on the cause of AIDS had been slightly 
different'
would it be the hypothesis of immune overload that is universally accepted 
today?
could the case of AIDS Discourse be Described in categories
of Obi ectivist EPistemologt ?
The question remains: Could the above situation not be equally well 
explained using
categories taken from the objectivist model of knowledge lsee zybettowicz 
1995:
5S-71,]2In attempting such an interpretation several problems would 
have to be
dealt with. The first is that a cognitive consensus on the HIV/AIDS relationship
was formed in the absence of binding scientific proof' Of course, it could 
be argued
that it was in the end shown that HIV causes AIDS: The theory is 
today much
better grounded than in the period under analysis. But how could 
scientists have
propounded such a result in the years 1982-1986? The second problem 
is how to
explain the success of the retrovirus paradigm in the perspective 
of the defeat of
the imrnune overload approach? Both approaches turned out, 
in the analyzed time
period, to be degeneratitg ,"r"ur"t progiums [cf. Lakat os L9771'New proofs 
on their
behalf did nor appear and-more impoitantly-they did not make it 
possible to deal
with the epidemic. Both paradigms foimulated certain partially 
converging techniques
l ilE C{iLjl\lT'IVil CI_USUI{.I;-, OF SCiEi\iCE
cf iieatring vrltli tite probie*is *f ,lhe epidernic.
aprraisal of tireir effectivensss was done within
discourse.
i1,i
it can be sr-rpposeci, howe.ier, .ihai a;l
the frarnework of the self-iegitimizing
Frorn the position of the objectivist rnodel of knowledge the foilowing accr:saticn
can be leveieci at this argument: Could what is being suggestecl by any chance be that
the epidemic and the relation between F{IV and AIDS was created, or evcn ..macie
up" by scientists? A certain explanation is necessary here. The present analysis is not
dealing with the world as understood in objectivist categories. It does not concentrate
on the "wolld in itself" or "the reality lying underneath," but on certain of its rnodels
generated by the research community. As was shown by Bruno Latour [79811, from
the SSK and STS perspective, reality is not a resource for settling controversies, but
rather it is an outcome of scientific negotiation-by closing black boxes scientists
define what will generally be iaken as reality. The present text is not a work in the
field of epidemiology, viroiogy, or the methoclology of the naturai sciences. I am not
trying here to answer the question of whether there is a relation between HtrV and
AIDS or whether it is only an artifact or hoax. It was likewise not my intention to
evaluate the scientific cornpetence of representatives of the given field of research.
The real object of analysis was the procedures and patterns of discourse that allowed
the objectification of the retrovirus hypothesis. In writing about objectification, I do
not mean that something was physically shaped, constructed or created. The term
"objectification" refers exclusively to the status that was generally ascribed to a given
object within the framework of the discourse under analvsis.
Conclusion: the Cognitive Closure of Science
In the present essay, we have reconstructed sorne of the social factors that produce
a situation where the findings of individual laboratories can be quickly transformed
into black boxes. Contrary to the general image of scientific culture and the criticism
that has been linked to it, at least since Karl Popper, in the case of many flelds of
research there exists a systernic encouragement to build black boxes instead of opening
discussion or trying to disassemble what is held to be a hermetically sealed black box.
The manner in which scientists will approach research is partially derived from the
economics of the "science game" characteristic of their research field. As STS has
shown, there is no such thing as a universal set of procedural rules for all scientific
fields. Research fields differ in terms of their own organizational ecology. As Stephan
Fuchs has shown, this "ecology" consists in the nature and availabilify of research
resources, as well as the probabilify of success (or what may be considered success on
the grounds of the principles of a given discipline). In addition, the variations in what
could be called the research sfyle (in accordance with Ludwik Fleck), the manner in
which a given field is represented in the public sphere, and what ties it has with such
areas as industry, should be taken into account.
The example of the controversy over the cause of AtrDS shows that research fields
often function on the principle of self-legitimization and self-reference, which leads
f g
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to their cognitive ciosure to tile wofid. AS we irave 
seen, this discourse was cofifigllr€d
in such a way that researchers, through mutual 
reference and theoretical imputaticns,
causedthebasicpremiseaboutthecauseancieffectrelationslripbeilveenFltVand
AlDstobegintobeunivsrsallyacceptedaSanindisputablefact.Twoissuesarekeyin
this context. First, the retrovirus hypothesis 
was accepted in spite of a lack of conclusive
proofs-atleastaccordingtotheotfi,iuttydeclaredrnethodologicalstandardsofthe
given fie1d. In other *ord*s, through the effect 
of "stacking" black boxes and shifting
modalities, the HIV/AIDS hypothesis became 
an unrevisable fact on which a series
of scientific flndings and social institutions were 
constructed. second. faith in the
hypothesis faciiitatld, in the long term, its final 
verification' Attention shouid be paid
to the fact that in the case of the debate around 
AIDS an important role was played
by public representation. we are not clealing 
here with a situation where scientists
pubiicly announced resuits only after obtaining 
certainty; hypotheses' which were
contested by partof the community, wefe presented 
as theses around which a broad
consensus existed. The problem is not only 
the premature announcement of the
resuits, but also the pressure that was exerted 
on the researchers' In such conditions
the process of closing a black box acquires 
an entirely different dynamic and scientific
assumptions are "u"l 
*or" quickly made into unchangeable facts'
The case of the debate around the cause 
of AIDS isln certain respects exceptionatr'
Itexempiifiesthefunctiorringofanautopoieticcognitivesysteminthedomainofsci-
entific research in an aimost pure form' 
Is it, however' an isolated instance? 
Analyses
could presumably be made of the ways in 
which a consensus was formed around
many other ,ri"rrtifi. theses having turlreact'lng 
political' cultural' or economic con-
sequences. It is worth quoting here Robert Gallo's 
answef in 1988 to researchers
questioning HIV as the direct cause of AIDS: 
"As anybody in the business knows who
works[withAIDS],thereismoreevidencethatthisviruscausesAIDSthanyouhave
with the majority of diseases [that we] long 
ago have accepted [as caused by 
virus s]"
[according to Epstein 1996:.90]' 
of .o,,.,", the answer quoted here is a rhetorical
measure aimed at representing the HIV/AIDS 
relationship as so obvious as not to
be worth discussing. However, if Gallo's statement 
is treated as representative' it
could be asked how many other theses 
concerning the mechanisms by which 
disease
is produced were .onu"ri"d into black boxes 
in an analogous manner' Furthermore'
we do not need to rimit ourselves excrusively 
to an urrulyrir of biorogical epidemics'
ThecontroversyaroundtheetiologyandwentllltatusofADHD,aswellaSmany
other psychiatric assumptiorr, 6iik, Kutchins 1gg27, 
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